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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TOMMIE MAURINE BROWN,

Respondent,
vs.
HAROLD COOK and
CORA COOK,

Appellants

~

Case No.
7959

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The respondent, plaintiff below, and mother of
Ronald Glen Cook, age 3 years, instituted a habeas
corpus proceeding directed against the defendants
Harold Cook and Cora Cook, to gain custody of said
child from the defendants, who, as paternal grandparents having physical custody of the child had
refused to allow plaintiff custody of the child (Tr.
25, 33).
Plaintiff was divorced from her former husband,
Glen H. Cook, father of the child, in the State of
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Wyoming, by a decree of divorce which failed to
award custody of the child to either party. The
former husband, Glen Cook, is a member of the
Armed Forces and as such was not within the state
amenable to process, and had left the child with his
parents, the defendants.
Plaintiff was refused custody of the child by the
paternal grandparents, and accordingly instituted
these proceedings out of which the contempt proceedings arose. Her testimony was to the effect that
they (the grandparents) wouldn't let her take the
child out of the yard CTr. 25) and appellant Harold
Cook admitted on examination that his wife had
refused to let plaintiff take the child CTr. 33).
A writ of habeas corpus was served upon the
defendants on December 1, 1952 ordering them to
come before the court on December 9, 1952 at 10:00
a.m. and to bring with them Ronald Glen Cook.
( R. 3, 4.) The defendants appeared before the court
on the day and at the hour appointed, but failed to
bring with them the child, as ordered. Out of this
failure arose the contempt proceeding and judgment.
The record reveals that after the writ of habeas
corpus was served upon him the grandfather immediately telephoned and telegraphed his son who was
in the Army in California CTr. 32, 33). VVhen he
called his son, he told him that he had better cmne
home CTr. 36). In response to this call and tele-
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gram, the son arrived in Vernal apparently on the
evening of December 8, 1952 (Tr. 31) and immediately proceeded to take the child, saying "I ain't
going to stay here, I am going to take him and go."
CTr. 31 ), and further, that he was going to get out
of the State of Utah (Tr. 32). The grandfather made
no protests, told no one of the fact that the father
had taken the child, and consulted with no authorities as to what he should do (Tr. 31). Subsequently,
in an effort to avoid the very obvious import of this
testimony Mr. Cook sought to explain that his son
hadn't said when he was going out of the State of
Utah, Tr. 33), that he didn't know his son was going
to take the boy (Tr. 35), and that he thought his
son was going home and didn't know he was leaving
the place with him(Tr. 36). The circumstances under ·which the original statements were made and
acts done, and the tenor of the examination and
answers as revealed at page 36 of the transcript in
particular are so evasive as to prompt the court in
reviewing this matter to state at page 41:
The Court finds that upon being served
with the writ, the defendant Harold Cook did
get in touch with the natural father, by telephone and telegram, informed him of the proceedings, and urged him to come home; finds
that the natural father did come ~home the
day before the hearing; that he remained only
a short while; that in the afternoon of the
same day, or late-which may have been
evening, the natural father declared to the
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defendant Harold Cook in these words: "I
ain't going to stay here, I am going to take
him and go."
The record does not show that the defendant Harold Cook did anything other than
to inform the natural father that he was supposed to have the child in court the next day.
He did not call his counsel for advice. He
did not call counsel for the petitioner, to notify
him of the son's claim. He made no effort to
get counsel from any law officer such as the
Sheriff who served the writ, "vho may have
given him some advice. But without doing
anything at all, and under circumstances
where he could not, as shown by the wording,
have misunderstood the purpose of the father,
he permitted, and the Court feels strongly
that he connived with the father, to take the
child out of the jurisdiction of the Court. That
was a direct violation of the order of the Court.
His testimony before the Court establishes the
fact of his contemptuous conduct, and the
Court does find him guilty of contempt of
court."
The Court also found that as between the mother
and the paternal grandparents that the mother was
entitled to the custody of the child, and that she was
a fit and proper person to have the custody of the
child, which was the issue directly presented by the
habeas corpus proceedings.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

The Court correctly ruled that as between plaintiff and the defendants the Plaintiff was entitled to
the custody of the child.
II

No affidavit was necessary in order to hold the
Defendant Harold Cook in contempt of Court.
III

The evidence sustains the order of the Court
committing defendant Harold Cook for contempt
of Court.

IV
No prejudicial error appears in the record stemming from the Court's ruling giving the defendant
Harold Cook the opportunity to produce the child.

v
The Court acted within its jurisdiction .in sentencing the Defendant for contempt. The findings
of the Court and its conclusions therefrom as stated
in the record were sufficient to authorize the judgment of contempt. Any further findings of the
Court were waived.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Court correctly ruled that as between plaintiff
and the Defendants the Plaintiff was entitled to the
custody of the three year old child.

Perhaps at the outset of the argument on this
point it would be well to point out that there is no
evidence that the child was out of the jurisdiction of
the Court at the time of the hearing at 10:00 a.m.
December 9, 1952. The only evidence as to this is
the statement of Glen Cook that he was taking the
child to California. He took the child on the evening
of December 8, and left, and his whereabout thereafter was either not known or not divulged. If he
was in the process of taking the child to. California,
then the likelihood is that the child was still in Utah
the following morning. Glen Cook left his automobile at Vernal, and since no railroad services this
area, he 1nust have left for California by bus, which
would mean that he would cross the entire state of
Utah from east to west before leaving Utah.
Ho\'vever, the law is clear that where the court
has jurisdiction of the parties to a custody proceeding,
the physical absence of the child after institution of
the proceedings, or even before, in no wise affects
the jurisdiction of the court to make the adjudication
of custody. Therefore, it is of little concern from
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a legal standpoint whether the child was or was
not out of the jurisdiction of the court.
In Little v. Little, (Ala.) 30 So. 2d 386, the court
held that once jurisdiction had attached in a custody
suit that the jurisdiction of the court was not divested
by removal of the child from the state by its mother.
In Maloney v. Maloney, 67 Cal. App. 2d 278,
15+ P. 2d +~6, where the father took the children
out of the state while a suit for their custody was
pending, the court in holding that the court retained
jurisdiction to a"vard their custody said: " ... Jurisdiction once acquired is not defeated by subsequent
events which might have prevented jurisdiction had
they occurred before personal service of the action
was made ... "
In Roberts v. Roberts, 300 Ky. 454, 189 S.W.
2d 691, the court, in reiterating this same rule points
out that to hold otherwise would make it virtually
impossible to arrive at a final determination of the
custody of a child because all that would be necessary
would be to remove the child from the jurisdiction
before the judgment was entered.
To like effect is Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 12
So. 2d 425; McMillan v. McMillan, 114 Colo., 24 7
158 P. 2d 444; State v. Porterfield, 221 Mo. App. 874,
285 S.W. 786; Burckhalter v. Conyer, 285 S.W. 606
and Peacock v. Bradshaw, 194 S.W. 2d 551.
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In the instant case, the Court had jurisdiction ·at
the time the writ was served and the complaint and
petition filed, and the fact that the child was taken
from the state thereafter would in no wise defeat
the right of the Court to adjudicate custody as between the mother and the paternal grandparents.
An examination of the cases cited by Appellant under
this point reveals nothing to the contrary.

It is to be noted that nowhere does appellant
raise the contention that factually the mother was
not entitled to the award of custody, but only that the
Court had no jurisdiction to make the award.
POINT II
No affidavit was necessary in order to hold the
Defendant Harold Cook in contempt of Court.

Appellant's argument at point 2 of his brief
proceeds upon the assumption that the contempt
involved was committed out of the presence of the
Court, and he relies among others upon the case of
Robinson vs. City Council for Ogden, 112 Utah 36,
185 P. 2d 256, \Vhich involved contemptuous conduct
and speech in the presence of the judge as an individual, but not in the presence of the Court in the
legal sense. The law is clear, that indir~ct or constructive contempts should be prosecuted by affidavit.
However, the case before the court is not such a case.
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\Vhile it is true that the acts which rendered it
impossible for the defendant Harold Cook to comply
with the order of the Court were not concluded in
the presence of the Court, this does not control the
question of "'hether the contempt was in fact committed in the presence of the Court. As the Court
points out at pages 40 and 41 of the transcript:
''The record should show, that the writ
of habeas corpus in this matter is in due form,
that it commanded the defendants, Harold
Cook and Cora Cook, to: 'Appear before the
Judge of the above-entitled court on the 9th
day of December, 1952, at the courtroom in
the County Courthouse at Vernal, Utah, at the
hour of 10 o'clock a.m., and to bring with you
the person of Ronald Glen Cook, then and
there to be dealt with according to law."

* * *
"The record in this case already shows
that at the time commanded in the writ, the
respondents to the writ failed to have the
person of Ronald Glen Cook before the Court
as commanded by the writ."
Therein lies the essence of the contempt of
Court in the instant case. The order of the Court
which was violated was an order requiring the defendants to bring the boy before the court at a time
certain, and the contempt consisted of failing to produce the boy at that time before the court.
The concept of "presence of the court" is perhaps
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best illustrated by the situation of an affirmative act,
as where the court calls for order, and someone physically present disobeys that order by continuing
boistrous. However, the negative act of disobedience
is nonetheless committed in the presence of the Court,
where, as here, upon order the defendant failed to
do in the presence of the court that which he was
instructed to do. The negative act in this case. consisted of failure to bring the child into court.
As recognized in the case of State vs. Morris,
120 Wash. 146, 207 P. 18, where a receiver failed to
report receipts to the court as ordered by the court,
negative acts may constitute direct contempt.
In Smythe vs. Smythe, 28 Okl. 2826, 114 P. 257,
the Court had before it facts very similar to those here
involved, except that the writ of habeas corpus was
directed against the father of a minor child rather
than against the grandparent.
The court reviewed the general law, \vhich is to
the effect that contempts are divided into two classes
( 1) Direct con tempts committed in the presence of
the Court, and (2) Constructive contempts which
arise out of matters not transpiring in the presence
of the Court.
The Court reviewed numerous
authorities and holds that violation of an order to
produce the person of a minor child constitutes a
direct contempt of the court in its presence.
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As indicated in 12 Am. Jur. 391, Contempt Sec.
4: "Negative acts may also constitute direct contempt,
as for instance, failure to produce a prisoner at a
trial or hearing" ... At page 390 of the same work
the classification is noted, that direct or indirect
contempt depends upon whether the contempt is
committed within or outside the presence of the court.
The reason, of course, for an affidavit where
the contempt is committed out of the presence of the
court is to apprise the court of the facts claimed to
constitute contempt. The theory is that the court
is unaware of the disparagement of its dignity or
authority in such case, and it is necessary therefore
that the court in some way be advised of the violation.
This is illustrated in the ordinary situation of an
alimony or support money order which is not complied with. The proper vehicle to bring to the court's
attention the failure to comply with the court's order
would be by affidavit.
Examine for a moment the facts of this case.
Did not the Court have the full and complete knowledge of the failure of the defendant Harold Cook to
produce the boy before him? How would an affidavit have provided the court with any more or
additional information than it then had? As to the
defendant Harold Cooks' opportunity to defend
against the contempt charged- his own counsel put
him on the stand, and he was examined and cross-
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examined at length. He can scarcely claim at this
point that he was not given adequate notice of the
contempt proceeding or that he lacked opportunity
to defend against the charge.
Tested then, by the standard of whether the
court knew of his own knowledge of the failure to
comply with its order, it is apparent that this is not
the situation contemplated by the statute where an
affidavit would be required. I-Iad counsel in this
case prepared an affidavit, it would have recited
exactly the facts which the court had first hand
knowledge of, that is, that the defendant failed to
bring the boy into court as ordered.
The contempt here committed and punished
was a direct contempt commited in the presence
of the Court. This also provides a full and complete
answer to points No. 8 and 9 of Appellant's brief.
To amplify, however, in rebuttal of point 7 of
appellant's brief, and to illustrate the lack of merit
thereof, the record utterly fails to sustain the contention of the appellant that he was not given an opportunity to answer and present evidence a provided b)'
law.
At page 2 of the transcript of testimony, as an
introductory preface to the proceedings before the
court, Counsel for petitioner stated:
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MR. HAMMOND: In this matter your
honor., the plaintiff and petitioner is ready to
proceed. Mr. Nash has brought a matter to my
attention in this. Perhaps we should inform
the Court. Mr. Nash informs me that last
night the father of the minor child came into
Vernal and took him out of the state of Utah,
as far as you know; is that right?
Whereupon, the following colloquy ;took place:
MR. NASH: As far as the folks know.
I \Yas retained Saturday night, or Sunday, I
should say, to go over this matter and to attempt a defense, and I was preparing it. And
this morning I was advised that the father had
taken the child. The parents are here, the
grandparents, and the persons whom the writ
was issued against, they are here in court.
THE COURT: Do you have any question
about \'Vhether the grandparents may be guilty
of contempt in allowing the child to go out,
after service of the Order?
MR. HAMMOND: It would seem to me
that they would be, because the child was here
when they were served with an order requiring them to have him in court this morning.
MR. NASH: The grandparents - I explored that possibility, your Honor, and I
don't see how they could be guilty of contempt, because the custody of that child was
not awarded to the grandparents.
THE COURT: It doesn't make any difference. They had it when the order was
served.
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It is apparent therefore, that the matter of contempt of court was raised at the very outset of the
hearing. Not only that, but Mr. Harold Cook was
called as a witness by his counsel, and the gist of his
examination was an abortive attempt to justify his
failure to comply with the order of the court rather
than being directed to the question of right of custody
as between the mother and the paternal grandparents
(Tr. 30, 31, 32).
At page 32 of the transcript of evidence the
court said:
"The questions that are before the court
i.e., whether or not this Court could decree
her right to the child as against the defendants,
and the question of the contempt of the defendant Harold Cook, are matters which the
Court doesn't want to decide hastily, and the
Court will therefore take those two matters
under advisement."

* * *
"Of course as to Mr. Cook, it must he
understood that if the Court calls hirn back
for entry of any order in respect to the rontempt motion that is made, that he will respond. Oherwise the Court will issue a bench
warrant for him. You will also advise him
of that fact, will you not?"
Thereupon, the court took the matter under
advisement and did not rule thereon until the after-
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noon of December 11, 1952, at which time the Court
review·ed for counsel at some length the evidence
and the law before making his findings as to contempt.
Thus, to this point there can be no question but
that appellant and his counsel vvere well aware of the
contempt proceeding in progress and had done what
they could to rebut it. If appellant felt that he had
not been given an adequate hearing (since quite obviously he had been given a hearing and had attempted a defense) then it was incumbent upon him
to raise this matter with the court in order that a
fuller hearing could be had if he so desired. This
he did not do, and in fact, in answer to the question
asked by the Court as set out by appellant in his
brief at page 20, as to whether defendant was prepared to receive judgment of the court, counsel for
defendant answered: (Tr. 42) "He is, your honor."
In response to the query of the court as to whether
any reason existed why judgment should not be pronounced at that time, the defendant answered: (Tr.
42) "No."
At all stages of the proceeding the defendant
Harold Cook was apprised of the fact that the court
was reviewing the question of contempt of court for
failure to comply with the writ of habeas corpus; and
therefore no merit exists in point 7 of appellant's
brief.
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POINT Ill
The evidence sustains the order of the Court committing defendant Harold Cook for contempt of Court.

In point 3, 4 and 5 of appellants brief they attack
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings
as made by the Court with respect to the contempt
proceeding arising out of the habeas corpus proceeding and the failure of Harold Cook to produce the boy
as ordered by the Court.
We have heretofore reviewed the facts which
prompted the court to hold the appellant Harold
Cook in contempt. To recapitulate however, the
writ commanding the defendants to produce the boy
was served upon them at a time when they held
physical custody of the child, and could comply with
the order. Defendant immediately set about to render the order of the court impossible of performance
by telephoning and telegraphing his son to the effect
that he better come home. Upon the son arriving the
evening before the morning upon which the child
was to be produced, despite the fact that the son
quite clearly and distinctly, and under circumstances
which could scarcely have been misunderstood, indicated to the defendant Harold Cook, that he proposed
to take the child out of the State ( Tr. 31 ) , the defendant Harold Cook did absolutely nothing to alter
this course of events. To the contrary, the evasive
attitude of the dPfendant in court, his very apparent
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effort to avoid the effect of his own testimony when it
became apparent to him that he had already said too
much, make it amply clear that the whole course
of events \Yas intended for the sole purpose of getting
the child out of the reach of the petitioner in violation
of the order of the court. In so doing, he not only
made no reasonable effort to insure that he could
comply with the order of the Court, but actively
sought to thwart that order.
The chain of events is such that only one conclusion logically follows; that the defendant Harold
Cook made every effort to thwart the order of the
Court, made every effort to place it out of his power
to comply with the order of the Court, and went to
all lengths to prevent the court from discovering
the truth of the matter at the hearing. As the court
expressed it: "The court feels strongly that he
connived with the father to take the child out of the
jurisdiction of the Court. That was a direct violation
of the order of the court. His testimony before the
court establishes the fact of his contemptuous conduct and the court does find him guilty of contempt."
(Tr. 42).
The law is clear that where a person has rendered himself unable to comply with an order of the
court he stands on the same footing as one having
the ability who nonetheless refuses. 12 Am. Jur.
Contempt p. 406, Sec. 24. At 12 Am. Jur. p. 439,
Contempt Sec. 72, the statement is made:
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". . . Where an alleged contemner, ho\\'ever has voluntarily and contumaciously
brought on himself disability to obey an order
or decree, he cannot avail himself of a plea
of inability to obey as a defense to a charge of
contempt. A person who seeks to satisfy. the
court that his failure to obey an order or decree
was due entirely to his inability to render obedience without fault on his part, must prove
such inability... "
and see also to like effect Mary Jane Stevens Company vs. Foley, 67 Utah 578, 248 p. 815.
The court in determining that appellant Harold
Cook was guilty of contempt of court found that the
defendant failed to notify the sheriff or other official,
his own counsel, or counsel for the plaintiff that Glen
Cook was in the act of taking or had taken the child
away. The court did not, as appellant suggests, base
the entire contempt upon failure to perform any one
of these acts, but to the contrary found these facts
along with the facts heretofore enumerated were
sufficient to indicate a contempt of court and that in
other words, the defense asserted was insufficient.
The court's judgment need not stand on any individual single finding with respect to the asserted defense of inability to comply, but all must be looked
to in establishing the contempt.
When all of the facts are put together~ that is,
prior refusal to let the mother take the child; infornling the father he better come home immediately,
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defendants actions and knowledge with respect thereto and with respect to his son having taken the boy
ostensibly to California the same evening, without
any remonstrance or other attempt to stop him; his
deliberate and calculated failure to notify anyone
of these facts \Yhile opportunity existed to insure that
the order of the court could and would be complied
with, and his patent efforts at covering up the details
of the transaction and evading direct answer to
questions to the extent that the court concluded therefrom that he had connived with his son to defeat the
order of the court, are sufficient in every respect to
sustain the judgment of the court.
Appellant asserts that under the case of Sherry
vs. Doyle, 68 Utah 74, 249 P. 250, this court has
announced the rule that the father has the paramount right to care and custody of his children. Of
course, this is a relative matter, and it is well established in this state that the mother has paramount
right to the care and custody of children of tender
years. Sec. 30-1-10, U.C.A. 1953; Briggs vs. Briggs,
111 Utah 418, 121 p. 2d 223; Baker vs. Baker, 110
Utah 462, 175 p. 2d 213.
Factually, the appellant can get no comfort
from the Sherry vs. Doyle case, since the court merely
held in a habeas corpus proceeding that as between
the father and third persons that the father was entitled to custody.
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The problem here involved is not one of paramount rights to custody of the child, but rather, can
one having the ability to comply with an order stand
by or even assist in rendering it impossible to comply
with the order of the court, then come before the
court and say "I can't now comply because I let
someone having a paramount right take the child."
In this instance the important thing was an order of
the court, which was paramount and prior to any
custodial rights of any of the parties involved in this
unfortunate situation. The books are replete with
cases where property, articles and things, are ordered
held or produced before the court without regard
to the ultimate rights which may be affected thereby.
The very purpose of this order was to revievv the
custody question- as between the parties to the habeas
corpus proceeding. The paramount right in this
instance was the order of the court that the child
be produced. The ultimate rights of the parties
involved could in no way affect the validity of the
temporary charge placed upon the defendants that
they should see to it that the child was produced on
the day and at the time ordered. The situation
would not be altered by the fact that an infant was
involved rather than an inanimate object or a sum of
money or some other article or thing which the court
might have ordered produced at a given time.
Clearly, had the court ordered the defendant Harold
Cook to bring money in his possession before thP
court on a day certain, he would not havP felt that
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he had the right to turn it over to one of the persons
who asserted that he had some right therein. Particularly where he knew that another was asserting
rights therein which were to be the subject of the proceeding before the court.
POINT IV
No preiudicial error appears in the record stemming
from the Court's ruling giving the defendant Harold Cook
an opportunity to produce the child.

The fact that the Court after having pronounced
judgment upon defendant for contempt of court felt
constrained to give him an opportunity of securing
forgiveness of a portion of that judgment can in no
way be advanced as prejudicial error by the defendant. This is a matter favorable to the defendant,
of which he has no cause to complain. The judgment
of the Court was not conditional, but the court announced the following pronouncement of judgment
that under certain circumstances he would remit a
portion of that judgment. So long as the judgment
of contempt is itself sustainable, which it clearly is,
the fact that t4e court was willing to lessen the
stringency of that judgment regardless of the terms,
is not prejudicial to the defendant.
The fact that the court sought to rectify an
otherwise unsatisfactory situation of the father in
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the service having taken physical custody of the
child under circumstances where he obviously could
not take care of the child and adequately supervise
the child, an infant of three years, and would be
wholly unable to attend to the child's needs, and to
bring about a condition where the child could be
properly attended by his mother as it should under
Utah Lavv, is a laudable thing, rather than a matter
of censure as defendant would seem by his argument
to indicate.
The facts as they exist with reference to the
status of the father of the child and the obvious
inability to make him a party or even suspect or anticipate the need for such action, are such as to eliminate any force or effect of defendant's argument
based upon failure to include the father of the child
in the habeas corpus proceeding; and the argument,
apparently designed to indicate her general unfitness
to have custody of the child, is completely eliminated
by the finding of the court in the habeas corpus proceeding that the mother is a fit and proper person
to have custody of the child, from which finding the
defendant has not appealed. The mother quite obviously had not forfeited any custodial rights, and
there is no merit to the argument along these linPs.
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POINT V
The Court acted within its iurisdiction in sentencing
the Defendant for contempt.

The findings of the Court

and its conclusions therefrom as stated in the record
were suHicient to authorize the iudgment of contempt.
Any further findings of the Court were waived.

Appellant in his brief suggests that there were
no findings and that findings were not waived, and
that therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to sentence the defendant for contempt. Appellant however, has set up as points 3, 4 and 5 of his brief what
amounts to an attack upon the findings of the court,
as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain those
findings. Thus, apparently he has no trouble in
determining precisely what the trial court found,
from the record as it now stands.
On December 11, 1952, at the subsequent hearing of the matters here involved, the court, in considerable detail, as indicated by the transcript beginning at page 40, set forth his findings with respect
to the contempt proceeding. He stated in detail his
findings \tvith respect to what the defendant Harold
Cook had done and had failed to do, and his conclusion that the defendant Harold Cook was guilty of
contempt, and based thereon pronounced judgment
committing and fining defendant for that contempt.
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In the case of Hillyard v. District Court of Cache
County, 68 Utah 220, 249 p. 806, the court affirmed
the rule that in contempt cases findings and conclusions are necessary. The court stated, however:
". . . We are not to be understood as
holding that formal findings are absolutely
requisite to support a judgment, but it must
appear from the judgment or elsewhere in the
record that the court has found facts necessary
to support its judgment . . ."
Admitting that more formal written findings
and conclusions would have been desirable in the
case, however, it cannot be successfully argued that
no findings were made, nor that no conclusion was
drawn therefrom, since the record, certified as a
true report of the proceedings, recites the findings in
arnple detail to sustain the judgment. The .argument
by the appellant is that there were no findings or
conclusions. The record reveals that there were
findings and conclusions which lays this point at
rest.
The real problem thus is not the absence of
findings and conclusions, but whether or not the
findings in the form in which they appear in the
record satisfy the requirement of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P.,
which point hovvever, appellant does not raise.
All that Rule 52 (a) requires is that the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its
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conclusions of law thereon. No requirement as to
form of findings is in anywise set forth in the rule
nor is it specified with what formality they must be
drafted. 'Ve do have a guide, however, in the Hillyard case 'vhich says that formal findings are not
necessary, but only that it must appear from the
record that the court has found facts necessary to
support its judgment.
In the present instance, the findings, although
announced orally by the court, were recorded as a
part of the record just as fully as had the court in
chambers dictated the same to his reporter. The
ultimate responsibility for preparing findings of fact
rests with the court rather than counsel, and if the
court in a given case should see fit to alter, limit,
expand or reword proposed findings submitted by
counsel, he would, of course, be entitled to do so,
and he would then dictate the changes or new findings to the reporter. Whether that dictation is
effected with the formality which surrounds a separately prepared document, or whether it merely
partakes of findings by the court in open court
written down by the reporter, would appear to make
little, if any, difference. That these were the only
findings which the court proposed to make or proposed should be made in the contempt proceeding
is indicated in the record quite clearly at the bottom
of page 45 of the transcript. Thus, we do not have
the problem of these being merely an oral pro-
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nouncement of the things which he proposed to
include in later written findings .. Rather, they constituted the only written findings which he proposed
to make in the case.

It is earnestly asserted and respectfully submitted that the findings of the court in the present
instance satisfy the requirements of Rule 52 (a),
and that the problem is not absence of findings as
appellant raises the issue, but rather sufficiency as
to form and formality.
·
In the event, however, that it should be concluded that there is an absence of findings in this
case, we believe that the record amply sustains the
proposition that there has been a waiver of the need
for such findings.
Counsel for the defendant stated to the court
that defendant was ready to receive the judgment of
the court, and defendant state that no legal reason
existed why judgment should not be pronounced
(Tr. 42).
The following discussion occurred during thP
proceedings held on December 11, 1952, at the time
th~ court anl).ounced his findings, conclusions and
judgment.
MR. NASH: Your Honor, rl~fPndants
now make a motion for a re-hearing of this
matter.
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THE COURT: Can you make a motion
for a re-hearing that way, Mr. Nash?
* * *
lVIR. NASH: I would like to make that as
a motion your Honor.

* * *
THE COURT: There must be findings
and conclusions. Our Supreme Court has held
that there must be on habeas corpus matters.
That is 'vhat made me ask. Until the judgment of the Court on the writ is made- now
of course on your contempt, the judgment is
made, isn't it?
MR. NASH:

Yes.

It would appear that defendant waived any
further findings and conclusions other than those
theretofore made and entered, and any informality
existing therein was approved by the defendant to
the extent, at least, that he cannot now avoid the
judgment on this ground.
It should perhaps be pointed out that a supersedeas bond has been filed in this matter, with
relation to the contempt judgment, and that said
judgment has not been executed. Accordingly, if
the court were to conclude that no findings and
conclusions of law are present, and if the court concludes that there has not been a waiver of findings
in a more formal form, then it would seem that
under the record before the Court and the law cited
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by appellant to the effect that a party cannot be
committed for contempt in the absence of findings
and conclusions (Ex parte Gerber, 84 Utah 441, 29
P. 2d 932) that the proper disposition of this segment
of the case would be to remand the matter to the
district court for written findings prior to any committment being issued based thereon, and that otherwise the judgment could and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that
so far as the habeas corpus proceedings is concerned,
that the record amply sustains the decision of the
lower court.
It is further respectfully submitted that as to

the contempt proceeding arising out of the failure of
the appellant to produce the child before the court
as ordered, that the court was clearly justified under
the circumstances in holding the defendant in contempt of court for his obvious failure to comply with
the order of the court or make any effort whatsoever
to comply with that order, that it is incumbent upon
the court under similar circumstances to vindicatP
its authority and preserve its sanctity and the sanctity of its order and judgments, that no prejudicial
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error 'vas committed therein, and that the court had
jurisdiction and authority to act as it did.
Respectfully submitted,
COLTON & HAMMOND
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD
Attorneys for Petitioner and
Respondent.
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